Chihuahua #105 10/12/2026, 1:56:58 PM

Empty the community pool: spend to the ecosystem fund for an immediate, public burn

Chihuahua proposal #105: # Empty the community pool — burn it šŸ”„ This proposal transfers the entire spendable community pool balance to the Chihuahua ecosyst...

Yes

100%

No

0%

Abstain

0%

Veto

0%

Original Proposal Text

# Empty the community pool — burn it šŸ”„ This proposal transfers the entire spendable community pool balance to the Chihuahua ecosystem fund (`chihuahua14fketv99hlrlk80mkggw643spsj3yyf7qylvqn`), which will burn it in full, immediately and transparently, as soon as it is received. The burn transaction hashes will be published on chain so anyone can verify them. Balance moved: - **7,399,838,693 HUAHUA** (`7399838693030319 uhuahua`) - the pool's only other spendable IBC balance (`29291024 ibc/B1C671DAA104B8D93C7E4F2C9E0BAD4FEEB7AD0FF39F0DE91B471CD92DB077B5`) ## Why the community pool is a liability today Chihuahua's community pool holds billions of HUAHUA that fund nothing. It is not paying for development, grants, liquidity or operations — it simply sits there. An idle treasury controlled only by on-chain governance is not an asset, it is an attack surface. We have just seen what that costs. On 22 September 2026 an attacker used Neutron's own governance to pass an expedited proposal disguised as an "AI governance" initiative and, within 24 minutes of execution, seized control of ten Astroport and Drop contracts, draining about **$9.4M**. Neutron halted, Astroport told users to pull liquidity from every chain, and the Cosmos Hub stopped block production for roughly 25 hours to claw back part of the funds. The vote itself became the exploit. Chihuahua is exposed to the same class of attack. Proposal 104, live right now, is a working demonstration: an **expedited** community-pool spend, dressed up as "treasury control validation (C2-06)", that sends the entire spendable pool to the proposer's own address. The deposit is refundable, the framing is reassuring, and the payload empties the pool. That is exactly the Astroport pattern. As long as the pool holds a large idle balance, every governance cycle is a chance for someone to repeat this — with a better disguise, a bigger token buy or a quieter window. You cannot audit your way out of a honeypot; you remove the honey. ## The fix: burn it Burning the community pool removes the target permanently: - **Nothing left to steal.** A governance-drain proposal against an empty pool moves nothing. - **It is deflationary.** Chihuahua already burns fees on chain (counted on chain since v10). Burning an idle balance that funds nothing is the same policy applied where it is doing no work today. - **It can be rebuilt safely if ever needed.** If a real, funded program needs a treasury later, governance can create and fund one deliberately — rather than leaving a standing pile anyone can aim a proposal at. ## Why route through the ecosystem fund instead of a direct burn A single community-pool spend cannot cleanly burn mixed denominations. The pool holds HUAHUA alongside a non-HUAHUA IBC balance, and sending a foreign token to a burn address only locks it — it does not reduce any supply. The ecosystem fund (`chihuahua14fketv99hlrlk80mkggw643spsj3yyf7qylvqn`), the chain's known and governance-accountable treasury address, receives the balance, converts the non-HUAHUA portion to HUAHUA, and burns the total. Every step is published with transaction hashes, so the burn is fully verifiable. ## The ask Vote **YES** to move the spendable community pool to the ecosystem fund for an immediate, public burn — and vote against any proposal that moves the pool to a private address. šŸ•šŸ”„

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