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Terra #4856 11/24/2026, 2:24:37 PM

Removal of 0xPhilipp and a controlled transition

Terra proposal #4856: # Proposal 1 — Removal of 0xPhilipp and a controlled transition In this proposal, **PD** means the Phoenix Foundation and its relevant...

Yes

69%

No

0%

Abstain

6%

Veto

25%

If passed

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Original Proposal Text

# Proposal 1 — Removal of 0xPhilipp and a controlled transition In this proposal, **PD** means the Phoenix Foundation and its relevant PD Stewardship officeholders. This proposal is independent of Proposal 2. Passage establishes the community mandate; legal removal and contract changes require their applicable implementation steps. ## Decision requested Withdraw confidence in 0xPhilipp as a Foundation director and direct his removal from that office and the Stewardship Multisig through the applicable lawful procedures. Approve the exact limited transitional amendment in Appendix A and direct PD to carry out the implementation work below. This is a prospective confidence decision, not a finding of fraud, unlawful profit, liability or criminal conduct. It neither exonerates other directors nor determines the outcome of any investigation. The published [bylaws] establish separate corporate and technical steps. This proposal cannot use this amendment or any powers proposed in Proposal 2 to authorize its own adoption, removal or activation. PD must establish and pursue the lawful implementation route after passage. An unresolved legal or technical step must be identified and addressed through the implementation process below. ## 1. Post-vote directions to PD The "Passage Date" is the date this proposal is recorded as finally passed on chain. From that date, PD is directed to start implementation work within its existing lawful authority and publish progress weekly. Within 21 calendar days of passage, publish an implementation dossier covering the records, route, schedules, appointments, funding and completion dates specified in this section and Section 3. The Board is responsible for coordinating the response with the relevant records custodians and publishing the responsible implementers. This community reporting deadline starts at passage and does not wait for bylaw adoption, the appointment of counsel, or a preferred set of records. Where a required item is unavailable, identify its custodian, the request made, the exact gap, next action, responsible person and dated completion plan. Missing material is not deemed supplied. Within seven calendar days of passage, PD must publicly acknowledge the passed decision, name the responsible implementers and confirm that it will comply with the mandate through the applicable lawful procedures and provide the required documents and implementation response within 21 calendar days of passage. The acknowledgement records the community decision; it is not a second approval or an opportunity to reopen its merits. Late or withheld acknowledgement does not postpone or restart the 21-day deadline. A specific legal or technical obstacle must be identified and handled under Section 5, with unaffected work continuing. The dossier must publish the effective Charter and relevant amendments, or an authorized explanation of any publication restriction with the operative provisions made available for independent verification. Identify the exact removal and amendment instruments, applicable thresholds and vetoes, legal-effective-date rules, required notices, authorized signers, and required contract transactions. Seek independent Cayman advice on the interaction of §§2.2.6, 2.4.4.1, 2.4.5, 7.2 and 7.3 and the participation agreements. A routine contract membership transaction and a blockchain software upgrade are different mechanisms; establish which is actually required. No unspecified system upgrade is approved. Identify the person or office with standing to instruct counsel and pursue the applicable notice, arbitration, corporate or court process if signatures are withheld, including a lawful alternate for conflict or refusal. Seek and publish the acceptance, independence disclosures, scope and quotations of technical and conflict/commercial reviewers, counsel and an enforcement coordinator. State records-access arrangements, capped costs, the proposed funding source, existing funding authority and any further approval required. The conflict reviewer's remit includes historical §4.6.2 records, disinterested participation approvals and disputed milestone/commercial evidence, with lawful access and response rights. One qualified provider may cover more than one remit if its competence and independence are established. These appointments do not depend on Proposal 2. A new title or community designation alone supplies neither legal standing nor signing authority. PD may obtain records, request quotations and perform preparatory work within existing authority. A paid engagement may proceed only within a specific existing valid budget and approval route that covers it, with the required disinterested approvals. This proposal appropriates no unspecified amount and authorizes no unfunded commitment. Where further funding or appointment approval is needed, PD must publish the proposed provider, scope, amount or cap, duration, funding source and approval route within the same 21-day period and promptly put the specific request to the competent approver, including Terra Governance where required. Missing funding does not suspend records disclosure, available preparatory work or weekly reporting. Use an existing competent, disinterested authority for independent appointments. If none is available, put the provider and bounded engagement to Terra Governance for express selection and obtain any required legal approvals. Subjects of the review may supply records and request quotations but may not control substantive reviewer selection, findings, publication, dismissal or fee releases. Required formal signatures are distinct from those discretionary decisions. An incomplete appointment or funding process does not postpone an otherwise lawful removal, amendment, election or transfer that can safely proceed without it; identify any genuine dependency on the affected act specifically. The 21-day dossier must also identify the lawful contingency for too few disinterested signers, refusal to execute, or resignations or disqualifications leaving fewer than three directors. State the existing authority, authorized actors and necessary approvals. If no such route is available, disclose the precise missing authority and promptly seek the specific further approval; do not invent a lower quorum or suspend an existing duty to resign. The dossier is an implementation record produced after passage, not an undisclosed document incorporated into this vote. It may specify factual details and conforming execution steps within this mandate; it may not change the removal decision, eligible successor arrangements, powers, thresholds, safeguards, expenditure authority or deadlines. Publish the dated versions and exact instruments before using them. Any material departure or additional authorization requires a fresh express governance decision and applicable legal approvals. If no lawful route is available for an act, publish the specific obstacle and proposed lawful alternative under Section 5; do not substitute a different policy privately. The adopted instruments must expressly give Sections 1–5 and Appendix A their intended legal effect and identify the persons they bind; adoption of the quoted threshold clause alone is insufficient. Until those steps are completed, the post-passage directions are the community's mandate to PD to act through its existing powers. Amendments and contracts take legal effect through their applicable adoption and execution procedures. The "Adoption Date" is the objectively evidenced date on which the last required approval, consent, notice or other condition for those instruments' effectiveness is completed, subject to independent verification and any competent authority's jurisdiction. Publish the event and evidence promptly; delayed publication does not postpone or restart a clock. The broader "Transition Period" runs from that Adoption Date until the authorized removal, scheduled handover and community appointments restoring the five-director target are completed, evidenced separately and independently checked. The new Section 4 transaction controls apply throughout this period, including when four or five directors serve; they then cease unless separately adopted as continuing rules. Existing §4.6.2 and other pre-existing duties remain in force. The 60-day discretionary period may end much earlier; an incomplete handover never extends it. Handover, accrued reporting and enforcement duties survive until discharged or lawfully varied. The Passage Date reporting mandate is not postponed by any of these later events. Publish the case in this proposal and invite 0xPhilipp to respond during discussion and the on-chain voting period. Publish his response or a faithful linked summary alongside the proposal, identify disputed facts and permit factual corrections without silently changing the operative text under vote. Non-response does not establish an allegation. Preserve any notice and response rights required for legal removal, earned contractual rights, accrued rights including any applicable indemnity, and lawful confidentiality. A subsequent independent review must give affected persons at least seven calendar days to respond to proposed adverse findings; it does not presume this confidence vote established wrongdoing. ## 2. Removal, elections and continuity Begin lawful preparatory removal steps promptly after passage. Once the resolution has been validly adopted under the existing instruments, begin any remaining approved removal steps within seven calendar days and complete them without undue delay by the dated implementation timetable published under Section 1. The timetable may allow only the time reasonably necessary for identified legal or technical requirements; it cannot confer a discretionary right to defer removal. Publish the legal effective date, membership-removal transaction, revised Schedule 3 and verification evidence separately. Disclose and remedy any gap between legal removal and technical removal. Do not transfer private keys; replace authority through authorized transactions and secure credential rotation. Preserve proposal [4855]'s election rules, existing nominations, completed stages, eligibility and onboarding requirements, Treasury deposit approvals and refund accounting. Do not restart the fifth-director process. Its specific seven-day appointment timetable after selection and onboarding is unchanged. Within seven calendar days of effective removal, announce the separate replacement-seat timetable. Multiple vacancies are filled by separately identified, sequential elections. Incumbents execute the community-selected eligible candidate's appointment; they do not choose substitutes. If the fifth director joins before removal, removal normally leaves four directors and requires at least three approvals thereafter. If removal leaves three, the ongoing 4855 election supplies the next serving director, and the separate replacement election fills the remaining seat. A delay or dispute in one process does not erase a valid result in the other. Any different composition requires a separately authorized plan. Two-member governance is not authorized. Before removal, verify continuity arrangements for chain/security operations, Treasury access, incident response, records and contract administration. Identify accepted operators, access requirements, funded obligations, backup coverage and transition steps. No outgoing director is compelled by this vote to provide indefinite or unpaid services. Any continuing engagement requires independently approved, bounded terms and the conflict controls below. ## 3. Original handover commitments and completion Preserve the [TLA launch commitment]: contract administration was to transfer to PD Stewardship after one month and contract ownership after three months. The source describes ownership permissions over technical configuration; it does not establish ownership of all software, intellectual property or independent ERIS infrastructure. This resolution neither waives that commitment nor retrospectively approves a departure from it, and preserves any associated rights and obligations without pre-judging their legal enforceability. Any claimed prior amendment must be identified with its approving authority and evidence. Any proposed variation must separately identify the contracts, powers, assets, reasons, original commitment and exact change, and obtain the applicable express governance and legal approvals. Treasury investment alone does not establish protocol ownership. A general label such as "ERIS-owned infrastructure" does not determine whether administrative permissions were promised for transfer. This proposal authorizes no blanket return of administration or new Treasury exposure. Within 21 calendar days of passage, PD must publish a contract-by-contract schedule stating: chain and address; code/version; migration administrator; internal owner; controllers; pending transfers; role-granting and upgrade permissions; current holder and evidence block/time; direct and indirect control paths; intended successor; basis for transfer; required transaction, approvals and acceptance; dependencies; and independent verification tests. Identify uncertain attribution or disputed scope explicitly and provide the Section 1 completion plan for missing entries. The schedule documents the original commitments and this mandate; it cannot create a new entitlement to unrelated assets or waive an existing commitment. Do not label an incomplete or historical schedule as current or verified. Preserve off-chain credential/access dependencies in a secure counterpart with a useful public summary. Verify the relevant entries before executing the corresponding transfer. The same 21-day schedule must explicitly cover TLA global configuration and the Treasury and v3 contracts used by the Foundation, where applicable. Trace who can change owners, administrators, role grants, fee settings, asset destinations or upgrade permissions, including through shared configuration contracts. Identify retained privileged control and its basis; a transfer of one local role is not evidence that upstream control has also transferred. Inventorying a contract does not establish a right to take ownership of it. For each in-scope deployment, record the matching source repository and commit, deployed code identifier and checksum, build instructions and toolchain, licence, operating documentation and maintenance dependencies. Identify whether the Foundation and an independent replacement operator have the access and rights needed to inspect, reproduce, maintain and, where authorized, upgrade it without continuing dependence on the outgoing provider. Publish materials where rights permit; explain restrictions and provide lawful independent verification of protected material. A missing public repository alone does not establish what rights or access exist. Distinguish existing delivery obligations from any new licence or service that would require negotiation and separate approval. Before reporting software handover or independent operating readiness complete, publish the independent verifier's build and operational checks and any unresolved dependency. This is a separate milestone from director removal and permission-transfer transactions. Within the same 21-day period, publish a costed contingency plan for unavailable cooperation, code, permissions or operating support. Compare feasible continued operation, replacement operators, migration and orderly withdrawal options; identify Treasury and user-fund exposure, dependencies, costs, funding, timescales, approvals and service risks. If an option is not yet costable, identify the missing evidence and a dated plan to obtain it. Explain whether any option would require reconsidering the Alliance or its incentives. Put any proposed material change to Treasury exposure, custody, protocol arrangements or Alliance incentives to Terra Governance with its exact scope and required lawful approvals. This planning direction authorizes no automatic withdrawal, shutdown, incentive change, new commitment or waiver of an existing handover claim. Continue unaffected implementation and weekly reporting; the plan does not postpone removal or extend temporary authority. Complete scheduled transfers within 30 calendar days of valid adoption, subject to identified lawful prerequisites and the enforcement process below. Publish each transaction and a fresh independent check that the predecessor retains no direct or indirect privileged route to restore or override the transferred authority without fresh authorization. Trace upstream administrators, role-granting contracts, successor multisig control and pending ownership claims. Preserve evidence of completed transfers and exceptions. This is a bounded verification of the specified control paths, not a guarantee against every vulnerability or unknown key compromise. Removal from office, removal from the multisig and completion of the wider handover are separate milestones. Do not delay reporting a valid removal merely because a separate handover remains disputed; do not report the overall handover complete while scheduled authority remains outstanding. Publish unresolved acts, responsible parties, the specific obstacle, remedy and completion date, and pursue the approved enforcement route. A report alone does not satisfy the transfer duty. ## 4. Conflicts and spending during the transition Within seven calendar days of valid adoption, every director exercising transition authority must publish a declaration of ongoing material financial conflicts, the dated disclosures previously made to both Board and community, the majority-of-disinterested-directors approval for continued participation under §4.6.2, and its conditions. The register covers project ownership, paid roles, validator operations, commissions, protocol fees and other material economic relationships relevant to Foundation decisions. State when a required record cannot be located; a new disclosure does not prove earlier compliance, and visible transfers alone do not establish adequate disclosure. Protected material goes to an authorized independent reviewer, with a useful public summary. Apply the existing §4.6.2 according to its terms, including awareness of an ongoing material conflict and its resignation requirement unless the disclosure and continued-participation conditions are met. Give an affected director an opportunity to supply the records and respond. Distinguish absence of evidence from an established failure. A notice under this proposal does not itself remove a key, adjudicate past liability, or erase a past failure through later approval. If the applicable rule requires action, publish that action and its lawful implementation route. Proposal 2 is not a prerequisite to existing duties. From valid adoption, a beneficiary may not approve their own project budget, milestone acceptance or payment release. Any new discretionary grant, increased fee, Treasury allocation or payment amendment benefiting a director or a business they own, control or materially benefit from requires public conflict disclosure, stated commercial justification and the applicable disinterested approvals. Affiliation alone is not proof that all transactions are improper. Approval to remain a director is distinct from approval of a transaction; neither supplies the other's threshold. During the three-director interim configuration, new related-party funding, increased director compensation and new long-term commitments are prohibited. Existing enforceable obligations and minimum essential continuity arrangements require documented necessity, bounded duration/cost and independent approval; they may not be used to relabel a new grant, increase or extension. If a genuinely necessary new arrangement falls within a prohibition, obtain a separate specific community authorization and required legal approvals before committing it. Identify the contracts and limits in the continuity dossier rather than leave "long-term" or "essential" open-ended. Recusal never lowers the applicable approval requirement. If the required approvals cannot be obtained, use an available lawful contingency or disclose the missing authority and seek a specific further authorization; no beneficiary may count their own signature or grant an exception. No transaction is authorized merely because an independent reviewer considers it reasonable. ## 5. Accountability and refusal The responsible implementer must promptly publish any material obstacle or missed deadline, identifying the unfinished act, responsible officeholder, precise obstacle, evidence and remedy. This reporting direction covers the post-passage implementation work as well as acts following legal adoption. The notice refers any claimed obstruction to the appointed assessor; the independent coordinator must promptly transmit available records and initiate the referral even if the implementer withholds a notice. Until those appointments are available, the Board must publish the referral and appointment requests and notify the standing Supervisor and secretary within their existing remits. Their receipt gives them no additional signing power. Record disagreement fairly; a missed deadline alone does not prove bad faith. Continue unaffected work and report weekly until completion. The independently appointed legal or technical specialist must publish an assessment or specific provisional assessment within 21 calendar days after identification of the obstacle or the missed implementation deadline, whichever occurs first. Where no obstacle has been identified, assess the unfinished act and the available explanation for non-completion. Within that same 21-day period, refer any unresolved refusal or obstacle requiring a legal remedy to independent Cayman counsel and publish an authorized explanation of the proposed next step and timetable. These are concurrent requirements, not successive extensions. Withholding notice, referral or records, or delivering a late assessment, does not postpone either deadline. The funded engagement must provide records access and an alternate if the first assessor is unavailable or conflicted. Missing records must be identified in a provisional assessment and pursued. Publish any unavoidable delay and revised delivery date; delay is not automatic approval or an excuse to abandon the act. Follow any applicable §7.2 notice/arbitration requirements and any competent court process; do not assume all disputes can go directly to court or that an emergency Supervisor can replace a signature. This assessment period does not extend an implementation deadline or the temporary authority in Appendix A. A bylaw restriction does not itself establish that an agreement with a third party is void; use actual transaction controls and appropriate contractual terms, and obtain advice on any attempted unauthorized act. No enforcement mandate is an unlimited spending authority. Apply Section 1's budget and approval rules to advice, assessment, litigation and recovery. If independent appointment or funding is still unavailable at an assessment deadline, PD must publish the unavailable item, requests made, quotations or refusals received, proposed lawful next step and dated completion plan. That status report is not an independent assessment or completion of the obligation; the open item remains subject to weekly reporting and further community direction. No private-key takeover, asset seizure or unspecified chain intervention is authorized. ## Appendix A — Exact temporary bylaw addition and Schedule 3 instruction Adopt this Article through the current §7.3 and any applicable constitutional/contractual requirements. Incorporate its configurations and restrictions in Schedule 3. It has independent effect if Proposal 2 fails. If Proposal 2 is adopted, these specific transition provisions remain subject to their own scope and spending limits; general language in either proposal does not enlarge them. > **3.2.1.8 One-time community-authorized transition.** The "Transition Decision" is the single Terra Governance decision approving initial adoption of this Article, identified by its final on-chain ID and immutable text in the adoption record. This Article applies only to the removal and transition specified in that decision. It does not authorize a future reduction of Board size or threshold. > > **(a) Approval requirement.** All directors must approve until a fourth director is appointed, after which three approvals are required. The removal, this amendment and any corresponding configuration change must be validly authorized and executed under the rules then in force. All election and onboarding requirements remain unchanged. The adoption record shall state when the three-director transition begins; that is the activation date for the spending limits below. > > **(b) Membership changes.** Upon the fourth director taking office, membership and configuration shall be updated together to require at least three affirmative approvals out of four; upon the fifth, at least three out of five. If the specified removal leaves four directors, three approvals are required. This Article does not authorize operation with fewer than three directors. Recusal, formal abstention, weight changes or an earlier proposal snapshot shall not reduce the applicable affirmative-approval minimum. > > **(c) Permitted business.** Interim acts are limited to the approved mandate, existing valid budgets, conflict controls and the continuity schedule published under the Transition Decision's implementation directions, and faithful execution of specifically approved community decisions through their lawful procedures. A later schedule records permitted execution details; it cannot enlarge the approved powers, expenditure authority or exceptions. Incumbents may not select replacement directors, alter the election process, increase director compensation, grant new related-party funding or incur new long-term commitments. A separate specific community approval and all applicable legal approvals are required for an exception; an incumbent's own determination of necessity is insufficient. > > **(d) Expiry.** Discretionary interim authority expires 60 calendar days after activation, or earlier when the fourth director takes office. Continuing discretionary authority beyond day 60 requires fresh express Terra Governance approval specifying its fixed duration, powers and controls, followed by applicable legal adoption. Expiry does not change the approval requirement or remove the limited caretaker permission in paragraph (e). No deadline restarts because of a delayed report, a new resolution, a changing signer or adoption of another general governance proposal. > > **(e) Caretaker permission.** While exactly three directors remain after day 60, all directors must approve, and caretaker acts are limited to completing the already approved election and onboarding, installing the community-selected eligible director, performing necessary security work and discharging enforceable existing obligations within the permitted scope and controls in paragraph (c) and the published continuity schedule. The later schedule cannot add a discretionary power or new spending authorization. No discretionary investment, new grant, increased compensation or new related-party commitment is permitted. Publish weekly evidence of each caretaker act and outstanding appointment step. This permission ends at the fourth appointment, cannot operate with two directors, and cannot be enlarged by calling discretionary business "security" or "continuity". > > **(f) Verification and enforcement.** Before activation, publish and test the required transactions and controls, including old proposal snapshots, abstentions, recusals, simultaneous membership/threshold changes, the 60-day restriction and custody of any unrestricted execution path. Distinguish restrictions enforced by code from duties enforced through governance or law. A bylaw alone does not disable a transaction the code still permits. Identify any residual technical ability to act outside the mandate and the independent monitoring and funded remedy; do not represent it as technically prevented. Publish a renewal or exit plan by day 45 without delaying elections. Any materially unsafe or unresolved activation dependency must be corrected through the valid route before execution. ## Reasons and responses The confidence case concerns handling of concentrated approval power, outstanding handover commitments and beneficiary participation in approval. It is contestable. Voters may prefer to complete the fifth-director election and assess the Board before removal; this proposal makes that choice explicit and does not delay the election to secure a three-director interval. [A272] sought removal of another director and a 60% setting. It failed. A 2-of-3 configuration is not itself misconduct. This proposal requires all remaining directors to approve until a fourth director is appointed. [A291]'s proposed requirement for community approval before reducing the Board to three was a relevant safeguard supported by 0xPhilipp and MB; this proposal seeks such express approval. He also [offered a voting restriction] under which he would vote only NO or ABSTAIN during a three-member interim Board, except for onboarding. That proposed safeguard should be acknowledged; the offer alone does not establish a binding or technically enforced restriction. Timing or aligned votes alone do not establish motive. At the 14 November 2026 01:44 UTC evidence capture, [A296] was rejected with 50/100 YES from Rose and Vini; neither 0xPhilipp nor MB had a recorded ballot. Absence is not a NO vote, abstention or proof of motive. At that capture #4855's seven-day implementation-owner deadline had not expired. This dated snapshot is background, not a claim that a later deadline was breached. PD's post-passage report must include subsequent status and explanations relevant to implementation. The October [ampLUNA hub and CW20-ICS20 administration transfer] was a genuine partial handover. It must be credited without treating it as proof that every other role was transferred. Original TLA commitments concern identified permissions; their current holders and exact coverage require the schedule above. Other directors approved Estima's original [A266] grant without 0xPhilipp's vote. He subsequently proposed and voted on [A271]'s 45,000-USDC kickoff release. The 125,000-USDC grant included conditional later milestones; it is not established personal profit or a completed payout. The [Superbolt example] involved three YES votes. [A299]'s setup approval is not proof that funds were claimed. 0xPhilipp [says other directors verified milestones] before releases; obtain and assess that evidence. A later page capture does not establish that no work occurred. The proposal does not independently audit every transaction. His [5 November response] raises legal adoption, onboarding, Treasury approvals, factional control and due-process objections. The proposal addresses those concerns through the implementation dossier, the preserved election process, independent review, disinterested approvals and an opportunity to respond. The independent review in Proposal 2 must examine relevant decisions by all directors; removal neither establishes guilt nor terminates rights to respond. ## Voting and interaction YES withdraws confidence, directs the specified removal and approves the exact limited transition package, safeguards and post-passage directions in this text. It does not approve an unseen future dossier, unspecified expenditure or an alternative constitutional settlement. NO rejects that package; it neither repeals #4855 nor waives existing handover or conflict obligations. ABSTAIN and NO WITH VETO retain ordinary Terra effects. Proposal 2 is a separate choice. This proposal neither requires its passage nor imports its proposed general authority. No later general provision shall enlarge the transition mandate absent an express vote identifying the change. [bylaws]: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/phoenix-directive/docs/main/Phoenix%20Foundation%20-%20Bylaws.pdf [4855]: https://terra2.tdrsys.com/cosmos/gov/v1/proposals/4855 [TLA launch commitment]: https://github.com/phoenix-directive/docs/blob/7cebbd26048f0e1568a2aed55177090b90788d8b/common_backup/2024-08-12_24385_launching-terra-liquidity-alliance.md [5 November response]: https://forum.phoenix.money/t/phoenix-foundation-community-selection-of-a-fifth-director-and-future-appointments/70/4 [A272]: https://dao.phoenix.money/dao/terra1k8ug6dkzntczfzn76wsh24tdjmx944yj6mk063wum7n20cwd7lxq4lppjg/proposals/A272 [A291]: https://dao.phoenix.money/dao/terra1k8ug6dkzntczfzn76wsh24tdjmx944yj6mk063wum7n20cwd7lxq4lppjg/proposals/A291 [A296]: https://dao.phoenix.money/dao/terra1k8ug6dkzntczfzn76wsh24tdjmx944yj6mk063wum7n20cwd7lxq4lppjg/proposals/A296 [A266]: https://dao.phoenix.money/dao/terra1k8ug6dkzntczfzn76wsh24tdjmx944yj6mk063wum7n20cwd7lxq4lppjg/proposals/A266 [A271]: https://dao.phoenix.money/dao/terra1k8ug6dkzntczfzn76wsh24tdjmx944yj6mk063wum7n20cwd7lxq4lppjg/proposals/A271 [A299]: https://dao.phoenix.money/dao/terra1k8ug6dkzntczfzn76wsh24tdjmx944yj6mk063wum7n20cwd7lxq4lppjg/proposals/A299 [offered a voting restriction]: https://forum.phoenix.money/t/phoenix-foundation-appointment-of-an-emergency-supervisor/47/57 [says other directors verified milestones]: https://forum.phoenix.money/t/phoenix-foundation-appointment-of-an-emergency-supervisor/47/91 [ampLUNA hub and CW20-ICS20 administration transfer]: https://chainsco.pe/terra2/tx/86E599263604B396BFB0F35F2F4E505E2EA758B024315B1C055C14994E6242D9 [Superbolt example]: https://rest-archive.neutron.solva.solutions/cosmwasm/wasm/v1/contract/neutron19v3vnv8u67ynumwpltwnhd6umatjys9atmctwh288ummmlds5gms9efm6h/smart/eyJsaXN0X3ZvdGVzIjp7InByb3Bvc2FsX2lkIjozNSwibGltaXQiOjEwMH19 More details: https://gist.github.com/PFC-developer/9d3cebae67b5718b3a74699e40d921d9/f5c703162cb9b08a218dcec67aae6fe645d064dd#file-01-removal-and-transition-md

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